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Retaliatory Discharge for Filing a Workers'
Compensation Claim: The Development
of a Modern Tort Action
By JEAN C. LOVE*
In the early 1900's, state legislatures enacted workers' compensation
statutes to afford employees a more effective remedy for work-related,
accidental injuries than was available under tort law.1 Tort law provided
complete compensation, but required proof of negligence. Furthermore,
the defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and fellow-
servant negligence often barred recovery.2 Workers' compensation, in
contrast, provides remuneration for economic losses caused by work-re-
lated injuries without proof of fault. The legislation often is described as
a "bargain," "trade-off," or "compromise" between employees and em-
ployers. 3 Employees have relinquished complete compensation for eco-
nomic and noneconomic harm in exchange for no-fault benefits that
provide swift and certain reimbursement of most economic losses.4 On
the other hand, employers have sacrificed their tort law defenses in ex-
change for limited statutory liability that exempts them from jury ver-
dicts. 5 The basic policy underlying workers' compensation legislation
contemplates shifting the economic burden for work-related injuries from
the employee to the employer. 6
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. B.A., 1965, J.D., 1968, University
of Wisconsin. I am grateful to my close friend, Patricia Cain, Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Texas, for her invaluable comments on the first draft of this Article. I am also indebted
to my research assistant Lisa Tillman, as well as to Elizabeth Ikemire, Harriet Cummings,
Debra Roberts, and Nancy de la Pena, who updated Lisa's research after she graduated.
1. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.30 (1985); Epstein,
The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L.
REV. 775, 775-76 (1982); Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37
CORNELL L.Q. 206, 209 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Larson, Nature and Origins).
2. Larson, Nature and Origins, supra note 1, at 212.
3. Id. at 206; accord Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 179-80, 384 N.E.2d 353,
356 (1978); Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1023, 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1146
(1977).
4. Larson, Nature and Origins, supra note 1, at 206.
5. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Il. 2d 172, 180, 384 N.E.2d 353, 356 (1978).
6. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 251, 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1973).
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In 1973, the Indiana Supreme Court, in Frampton v. Central Indi-
ana Gas Co. ,v was asked to provide a remedy for an employee who had
been discharged from her job in retaliation for filing a workers' compen-
sation claim. The employer claimed a right to terminate the employee
without cause because she was an employee at will.8 The court agreed
that "under ordinary circumstances an employee at will may be dis-
charged without cause." 9 The court held, however, that when an em-
ployee at will is discharged "solely for exercising a statutorily conferred
right," courts should recognize an exception to the general rule.10 Be-
cause the employer's conduct constituted an "intentional, wrongful act,"
the court allowed the plaintiff to proceed with a tort action against the
employer for compensatory and punitive damages."'
The appellate court of Illinois has stated succinctly the justification
for recognizing a cause of action for this type of retaliatory discharge.
The court observed that the state's workers' compensation act abrogated
the employee's right to sue in tort in exchange for the receipt of no-fault
benefits under the act.' 2 In response to the employer's contention that an
employee at will may be discharged without cause, the court stated:
To accept defendant's argument here would be to say to the employee,
"Although you have no right to a tort action, you have a right to a
workmen's compensation claim which, while it may mean less money,
is a sure thing. However, if you exercise that right, we will fire you."'
3
Professor Larson finds it "odd" that the retaliatory discharge action
was "so long in coming."' 4 He speculates that "the explanation may be
in the fact that the conduct involved is so contemptible that [only] a few
modem employers would be willing to risk the opprobrium of being
found in such a posture."' 15 An equally probable explanation lies in the
traditional strength of the employment at will doctrine in the United
States. 16
7. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973). Prior to 1973, the action for retaliatory dis-
charge had been rejected in Missouri and South Carolina. Narens v. Campbell Sixty-Six Ex-
press, Inc., 347 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. 1961); Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122
(1956); Raley v. Darling Shop, 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950).
8. Frampton, 260 Ind. at 251-53, 297 N.E.2d at 428.
9. Id. at 253, 297 N.E.2d at 428.
10. Id.
11. Id. The plaintiff in Frampton prayed for $45,000 in actual damages and for $135,000
in punitive damages. Id. at 250, 297 N.E.2d at 427.
12. Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1024, 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1146
(1977).
13. Id. at 1024, 366 N.E.2d at 1147.
14. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.36(a), at 13-93 (1983).
15. Id.
16. For cases in which the courts, in deference to the employment at will doctrine, re-
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The English common law had no employment at will doctrine. Eng-
lish courts presumed that a contract for an indefinite term extended for
one year unless there existed reasonable cause to discharge an em-
ployee. 17 American courts in the nineteenth century rejected the English
rule.18 Influenced by the laissez-faire climate of the Industrial Revolu-
tion, American courts developed the employment at will doctrine.1 9 This
doctrine specified that when an employee was hired for an indefinite
term, the employer could discharge that employee "for good cause, for
no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty
of legal wrong." °20 By the beginning of the twentieth century, the doc-
trine had gained universal acceptance and had attained temporary consti-
tutional protection.
21
Since the New Deal, however, government regulation has tempered
the employment at will doctrine. 22 And, with the enactment of the Civil
jected the retaliatory discharge action for filing a workers' compensation claim, see Meeks v.
Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459 So. 2d 814 (Ala. 1984); Johnson v. Gary, 443 So. 2d 924 (Ala.
1983); Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C.
App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978); Raley v. Darling Shop, 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950).
17. For a more detailed discussion of the historical development of the at will doctrine,
see Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. I. LEGAL HIsT. 118
(1976).
18. Id.
19. Commentators agree that many courts were influenced by H.G. Wood's treatise on
master-servant relationships, in which he wrote:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is
upon him to establish it by proof.... [I]t is an indefinite hiring and is determinable
at the will of either party, and in this respect there is no distinction between domestic
and other servants.
H.G. WooD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877). See generally Blades, Employment at Will
vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 1404 (1967); Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 947 (1984);
Krauskopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modern At Will Rule, 51
UMKC L. REV. 189 (1983); Naylor, Employment at Will The Decay of an Anachronistic
Shield for Employers?, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 113 (1983-1984); Peck, Unjust Discharges From
Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Note, Protecting
Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1931 (1983).
20. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
21. In Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), the United States Supreme Court held
that statutes aimed at prohibiting employers from discriminating against union members were
unconstitutional. The Court retreated from this position in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding constitutionality of National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982), as applied by the National Labor Relations Board, which had found
that the employer had engaged in an unfair labor practice by discriminating against members
of the union with regard to hiring and tenure of employment).
22. Among the most significant federal statutes limiting employer freedom are the Labor
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Rights Act of 1964,23 Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to
discharge an employee because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Furthermore, Title VII makes it an "unlawful employment prac-
tice" for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because he
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or partic-
ipated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter. ' ' 24 Thus, Title VII not only carves out an exception to
the employment at will doctrine, but also creates a cause of action for
retaliatory discharge.25 Congress' creation of a retaliatory discharge ac-
tion in Title VII may well have paved the way for Frampton's recognition
of a retaliatory discharge action in the workers' compensation setting.
Since 1973, twenty-seven jurisdictions26 have developed some type
of civil remedy2 7 for the retaliatory discharge of an employee who has
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982) (limiting the em-
ployer's right to discriminate against union employees) and the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982) (setting minimum wage and maximum hours levels, limit-
ing child labor, and prohibiting sex discrimination in wages).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
24. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
25. See generally Denis, Title VI Retaliation Claims, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 642 (1984);
Spurlock, Proscribing Retaliation Under Title VII, 8 IND. L. REV. 453 (1975).
26. California: CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1986); Connecticut: CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 31-290a (West Supp. 1985); Florida: Smith v. Piezo Technology, 427 So. 2d
182 (Fla. 1983); Hawaii: HAWAii REV. STAT. §§ 378-31 to -38 (1976 & Supp. 1984); Illinois:
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Indiana: Frampton, 260 Ind.
249, 297 N.E.2d 425; Kansas: Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor
Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981); Kentucky: Firestone Textile Co. v. Mead-
ows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1361 (West Supp.
1985); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 111 (1984); Maryland: Roberts v. Citicorp
Diners Club, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 311 (D. Md. 1984) (applying Maryland law and relying on
Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464 (1981)); Michigan: Goins v.
Ford Motor Co., 131 Mich. App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184 (1983); Minnesota: MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 176.82 (West Supp. 1985); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon Supp. 1986);
Nevada: Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984); New Jersey: Lally v.
Copygraphics, Inc., 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34.15-39.1 (West
Supp. 1985); New Mexico: Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); New York:
N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 120 (McKinney Supp. 1986); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-6.1 (1985); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.90 (Page 1980); Oklahoma: OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 85, §§ 5-6 (West Supp. 1985); Oregon: Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 298
Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (1984); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.121, .410, .415, .420 (1983); Tennessee:
Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984); Texas: TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c
(Vernon Supp. 1986); Virginia: VA. CODE § 65.1-40.1 (Supp. 1985); West Virginia: Shanholtz
v. Monongahela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1980); Wisconsin: WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.35 (West Supp. 1985).
27. The civil remedies recognized by the jurisdictions listed supra note 26 include admin-
istrative remedies as well as civil causes of action for reinstatement and back pay. Some juris-
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filed a workers' compensation claim.28 Among these jurisdictions, eleven
now recognize a common-law tort action,29 while six states have created
a statutory cause of action for damages.30 Three additional states au-
thorize equitable relief for retaliatory discharge.31 Two states impose a
"civil penalty" of up to one year's back pay,32 and six states have created
an "administrative remedy," usually allowing reinstatement and back
pay.3
3
This Article first describes the evolution of the tort of retaliatory
discharge by examining the development of the various civil remedies
mentioned above. Next, the Article focuses on the components of the
retaliatory discharge tort action. It describes the contours of the prima
facie case of liability, considers the problems of proving the reason for
dictions recognize a tort action for compensatory and punitive damages. See infra notes 95-
111 & accompanying text.
28. See generally McGarry, Retaliatory Termination in Workmen's Compensation Cases,
44 TEX. B.J. 617 (1981); McWeeny, Out of the Fog: A Different View on Retaliatory Employee
Discharge, 54 CONN. B.J. 235 (1980); Note, Tort Remedy for Retaliatory Discharge: Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act Limits Employer's Power to Discharge Employees Terminable-at-
Will-Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 29 DE PAUL L. REv. 561 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Tort Remedy]; Casenote, Tort Action for Retaliatory Discharge Upon Filing Workmen's Com-
pensation Claims, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 659 (1979); Note, Workmen's Compensation-
Retaliatory Discharge-The Legislative Response to Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 58 N.C.L.
REv. 629 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Workmen's Compensation]; Note, Kelsay v. Mo-
torola, Inc.-Illinois Courts Welcome Retaliatory Discharge Suits Under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 839 [hereinafter cited as Note, Kelsay].
29. Illinois: Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Indiana:
Frampton, 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425; Kansas: Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County
Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981); Kentucky: Firestone Textile
Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983); Michigan: Goins v. Ford Motor Co., 131 Mich.
App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184 (1983); Nevada: Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394
(1984); New Jersey: Lally v. Copygraphics, Inc., 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981); New
Mexico: Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Oregon: Holien v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (1984) (concerning sex discrimination in employment);
Tennessee: Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984); West Virginia:
Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1980).
30. Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-290a (West Supp. 1985); Minnesota:
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.82 (West Supp. 1985); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780
(Vernon Supp. 1986); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985); Oklahoma: OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 85, §§ 5-6 (West Supp. 1985); Texas: TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon
Supp. 1986).
31. Ohio: OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.90 (Page 1980); Oregon: OR. REv. STAT.
§§ 659.121, .410, .415, .420 (1983); Virginia: VA. CODE § 65.1-40.1 (Supp. 1985).
32. Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1361 (West Supp. 1985); Wisconsin: Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 102.35 (West Supp. 1985).
33. California: CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1986); Connecticut: CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 31-290a (West Supp. 1985); Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 378-31 to -38
(1976 & Supp. 1984); Maine: ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 111 (1984); New Jersey: N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34.15-39.1 (West Supp. 1985); New York: N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 120
(McKinney Supp. 1986).
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the discharge, discusses the defenses, and then recommends the recogni-
tion of both legal and equitable remedies. Finally, the Article discusses
legislation that could be enacted in states that seek to provide an admin-
istrative remedy for retaliatory discharge, in addition to the civil reme-
dies authorized by the tort action.
This Article focuses on the tort of retaliatory discharge for the filing
of a workers' compensation claim. The ramifications of the Article, how-
ever, are considerably broader. Retaliatory discharge actions have been
recognized in a wide variety of contexts. 34 The method of establishing
the prima facie case of liability and selecting an appropriate remedy is the
same, regardless of the reason for the discharge. 35 The problems posed
by retaliatory discharge actions are especially complex because the em-
ployee brings a tort action, yet seeks a remedy that often calls for specific
performance of a contract 36 or for breach of contract damages.37 This
Article concentrates on the cause of action brought by an employee who
has been discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation
claim because the states provide a rich variety of remedies to such a
plaintiff. Consequently, this cause of action provides an ideal vehicle for
a case study of the emerging tort of retaliatory discharge.
Evolution of a Tort Action for Retaliatory Discharge
State legislatures played a leading role in the early development of
the tort of retaliatory discharge. Many states enacted criminal and civil
34. For example, a substantial number of federal regulatory statutes include provisions
prohibiting retaliation against employees for reporting violations of the statutes. Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(a)(9), 2302(b)(8), 7116(a)(4) (1982); Toxic Substance
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1982); Jury System Improvement Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1875 (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 6971 (1982); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (1982);
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1982); Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of
1980, 45 U.S.C. § 441 (1982). Employees are protected against retaliatory discharge for exer-
cising their rights under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982).
And an increasing number of states are protecting "whistleblowers" against retaliatory dis-
charge. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1102.5, 1105 (West 1971 & Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 418.301(11) (West 1985). See generally Annot., 9 A.L.R.4TH 329 (1985) (liabil-
ity for discharging at will employee for whistleblowing).
35. E.g., Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1985) (Title VII
retaliatory discharge); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385
(1980) (whistleblower's retaliatory discharge); Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. App.
1983) (workers' compensation retaliatory discharge); Axel v. Duffy-Mott Co., 47 N.Y.2d 1,
389 N.E.2d 1075, 416 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1979) (workers' compensation retaliatory discharge).
36. See, e.g., Duncan v. New York State Dev. Center, 93 A.D.2d 242, 463 N.Y.S.2d 540
(1983) (retaliatory discharge plaintiff granted reinstatement).
37. See, e.g., Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (authorizing retaliatory
discharge plaintiff to recover lost wages and incidental damages, such as moving expenses).
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penalties that expressed public opposition to the practice of retaliatory
discharge. Furthermore, a few states passed provisions expressly creat-
ing a duty not to discharge a workers' compensation claimant, thus pro-
viding the basis for an implied tort remedy.
The first phase of the development of the tort of retaliatory dis-
charge began when states imposed a criminal38 or civil 39 penalty for such
wrongful discharge. Missouri, the first state to legislate a criminal pen-
alty, imposed on the employer a fine of $50 to $500, imprisonment of one
week to one year, or both.4° These sanctions were relatively light, how-
ever, and they proved to be ineffective.41 Nevertheless, the criminal stat-
utes provided a basis for employees to assert tort claims against their
employers for retaliatory discharge. In Christy v. Petrus,42 for example, a
Missouri employee sought to recover $7500 in compensatory damages
and $10,000 in punitive damages for his allegedly wrongful discharge af-
ter he had filed a workers' compensation claim.
Initially, courts hesitated to ground a tort action upon an employer's
violation of a criminal statute. Thus, the Christy court held that the
plaintiff failed to state a cause of action.43 The court was unable to find
anything in the wording or in the historical background of the criminal
statute to indicate "any legislative intent to create a new civil claim of
this nature in the discharged employee."' 44 The Christy court empha-
sized the fact that the legislature had enacted the criminal penalty in
1925 as part of the original Missouri workers' compensation law.45 The
court thus deemed the section to be merely "preventive" in nature; it was
not intended to "remedy" an existing custom or practice relating to the
retaliatory discharge of workers' compensation claimants. 4
6
38. See, eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1335(b) (1976); CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West
Supp. 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 39A (1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon
1965) (replaced in 1973 with a civil remedy created by Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon
Supp. 1986)); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34.15-39.1 (West Supp. 1985).
39. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34.15-39.1 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 120
(McKinney Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.35 (West Supp. 1985).
40. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon 1965).
41. In Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956), the court observed that
the Missouri criminal statute had never been interpreted by an appellate court. Id. at 1190,
295 S.W.2d at 124. In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978), the
court noted the very real possibility that some employers would risk the threat of criminal
sanctions in order to avoid their responsibilities under the workers' compensation statute. Id.
at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 359.
42. 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956).
43. Id. at 1188, 295 S.W.2d at 123.
44. Id. at 1192, 295 S.W.2d at 126.
45. Id. at 1190, 295 S.W.2d at 124.
46. Id. at 1190-91, 295 S.W.2d at 125. In 1973, the Missouri legislature responded to
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Unlike Missouri, five other states imposed criminal penalties for re-
taliatory discharge after having enacted workers' compensation legisla-
tion.47  In these jurisdictions, plaintiffs were more successful in
establishing a common-law tort action for retaliatory discharge.48 For
example, in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. ,49 the Illinois Supreme Court recog-
nized a tort action based upon the public policy reflected in the following
criminal statute: "It shall be unlawful for any employer ... to discharge
or to threaten to discharge, or to refuse to rehire or recall to active ser-
vice in a suitable capacity an employee because of the exercise of his or
her rights or remedies granted to him or her by this Act." 50
The existence of the criminal statute encouraged the court in Kelsay
to recognize an exception to the common-law employment at will doc-
trine. 51 The employer in Kelsay contended that the legislature intended
the criminal sanctions to be the exclusive remedy for a retaliatory dis-
charge. 52 The court rejected this argument, however, observing that the
imposition "of a small fine, enuring to the benefit of the state, does noth-
ing to alleviate the plight of those employees who are threatened with
retaliation and forgo their rights, or those who lose their jobs when they
proceed to file claims under the Act."' 53 The Kelsay court also rejected
the employer's argument that the workers' compensation act's "exclusive
remedy" clause precluded a retaliatory discharge action.54 The Illinois
court, like other courts that subsequently have considered the issue,55
held that the exclusive remedy clause "was meant to limit recovery by
employees to the extent provided by the Act in regard to work-related
injuries, and was not intended to insulate the employer from independent
Christy by authorizing a "civil action for damages." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon
Supp. 1986).
47. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1335(b) (1976); CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1986);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.4(h) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101,
§ 39A (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34.15-39.1 (West Supp. 1985).
48. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Il. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Lally v.
Copygraphics, Inc., 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981).
49. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
50. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.4(h) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985). The statute was en-
acted after the plaintiff's discharge, but three years prior to the Illinois Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Kelsay. 74 Ill. 2d at 181, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
51. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 181, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
52. Id. at 184, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
53. Id. at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 359.
54. Id. at 184, 384 N.E.2d at 358. The exclusive remedy clause in Kelsay specified that
the provisions of the workers' compensation act "shall be the measure of the responsibility of
any employer." Id. For a general discussion of exclusive remedy provisions, see 2A A. LAR-
SON, supra note 1, §§ 65.00-67.50 (1983).
55. Annot., 32 A.L.R.4TH 1221 (1984).
[Vol. 37
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tort actions" 56 for the separate harm caused by a retaliatory discharge.
The second step in the evolution of the tort of retaliatory discharge
was taken when states enacted legislation prohibiting the act of retalia-
tory discharge without imposing criminal sanctions.57 Such legislation
left the courts free to design appropriate civil remedies, and precluded
employers from contending that the statute provided criminal penalties
that were intended to be exclusive.58 For example, in 1979 the Florida
legislature decreed: "No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge,
intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid
claim for compensation.., under the Workers' Compensation Law." 59
In Smith v. Piezo Technology,60 the Florida Supreme Court held that the
legislature had created a statutory tort action when it enacted this sec-
tion.61 Although the court refused to recognize a common-law tort ac-
tion for retaliatory discharge,62 it felt compelled to authorize a civil
remedy for the violation of the statute: "[I]t must be assumed that a
provision enacted by the legislature is intended to have some useful pur-
pose."'63 Thus, the court concluded that the statute not only created a
duty, but, by implication, also conferred upon the court the power to
create an appropriate remedy for the violation of that duty.
In the third phase of the development of the retaliatory discharge
tort, legislatures in several states authorized civil remedies to be adminis-
tered by workers' compensation agencies.6 These statutes were designed
to fill the need created by the courts' reluctance to recognize a common-
law tort action.
65
56. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 184, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
57. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.205 (West 1981); W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-1 (1985).
58. See supra notes 52-53 & accompanying text.
59. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.205 (West 1981). As originally proposed, the Florida statute
did provide for compensatory damages and injunctive relief, but the conference committee
deleted all of the remedies provisions. Piezo Technology v. Smith, 413 So. 2d 121, 124 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Ervin, J., dissenting), aff'd, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983).
60. 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983).
61. Id. at 184.
62. Id.
63. Id. The concurring judge would have gone further and recognized a common-law
tort action of retaliatory discharge. Id. at 185 (Overton, J., concurring).
64. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-290a
(West Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 378-31 to -38 (1976 & Supp. 1984); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23.1361 (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 111 (1984); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34.15-39.1 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 120 (McKinney
Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.35 (West Supp. 1985).
65. For cases refusing to recognize a common-law tort action, see Martin v. Tapley, 360
So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978); Narens v. Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc., 347 S.W.2d 204 (Mo.
1961); Christy, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122; Raley v. Darling Shop, 216 S.C. 536, 59 N.E.2d
148 (1950).
March 1986] RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Statutes creating an administrative remedy typically provide for re-
instatement and back pay. 66 The Louisiana and Wisconsin statutes limit
the amount of back pay recoverable to one year's lost wages. 67 Statutes
in other states permit the wrongfully discharged claimant to recover a
reasonable attorney's fee. 68 In California, the administrative agency as-
sesses an additional penalty payable to the employee in an amount equal
to one-half of the employee's workers' compensation benefits, but not to
exceed $10,000.69
A statute creating an administrative remedy may state explicitly
that it is the exclusive remedy for the victim of a retaliatory discharge.
70
Many of the legislatures that have created administrative remedies, how-
ever, have failed to resolve the issue of whether such a remedy purports
to be exclusive.7' In a state where the legislature has remained silent, a
Wisconsin appellate court has ruled that the administrative remedy is
exclusive. 72 That court relied on the doctrine that workers' compensa-
tion benefits are generally an injured employee's exclusive remedy:
The legislative intent behind worker's compensation was to limit
an employer's liability in exchange for the employe[e]'s sure and swift
recovery of scheduled payments .... The right of the employe[e] to
recover compensation provided for by worker's compensation is exclu-
sive of all other remedies against the employer; such is the nature of
the balance struck by the legislature.
73
66. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-
290a (West Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34.15-39.1 (West Supp. 1985). New York pro-
vides that an employer may not insure against liability for retaliatory discharge. N.Y. WORK.
COMP. LAW § 120 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
67. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.1361 (West Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.35
(West Supp. 1985). This limitation is reminiscent of the English common-law rule, which
presumed that a contract for an indefinite term extended for one year unless there was reason-
able cause to discharge the employee. See supra note 17 & accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-290a (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. WORK. CONIP.
LAW § 120 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
69. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1986).
70. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Eastern Fine Paper, Inc., 485 A.2d 228 (Me. 1984) (statute
provided for exclusivity of the administrative remedy).
71. This issue arises whenever the statute fails to specify the exclusivity of the administra-
tive remedy.
72. Cornejo v. Polycon Indus., Inc., 109 Wis. 2d 649, 327 N.W.2d 183 (Wis. Ct. App.
1982); accord Portillo v. G.T. Price Prods., Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 285, 182 Cal. Rptr. 291
(1982). For a discussion of the California case law, see Miller & Estes, Recent Judicial Limita-
tions on the Right to Discharge: A California Trilogy, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 65 (1982); Comment,
Public Policy Limitations on the Retaliatory Discharge of At Will Employees in the Private
Sector, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 811 (1981).




The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Lally v. Copygraphics, Inc., 74 has
concluded that a plaintiff has a common-law tort action for retaliatory
discharge in addition to, or in lieu of, an action for administrative relief.
The court determined that the penal75 and administrative remedies di-
rected at retaliatory discharge would be "augmented" by recognition of
an "alternative or supplemental judicial right to secure civil redress"
76
through a common-law tort action.77 Unlike Wisconsin, the New Jersey
court took the position that a common-law tort action for retaliatory
discharge complements the legislative policies that underlie the creation
of an administrative remedy.
78
The New Jersey Supreme Court's position is preferable because the
exclusive remedy clause relied upon by the Wisconsin court is only in-
tended to make workers' compensation benefits the exclusive remedy for
job-related injuries.79 An action for retaliatory discharge does not com-
pensate the worker for job-related injuries. Instead, it provides reim-
bursement for losses caused by the employer's wrongful conduct in
terminating an employee who has fied for workers' compensation bene-
fits.80 Furthermore, as stated by the New Jersey court, "if the Legisla-
ture had wanted to foreclose a judicial cause of action, it would have
done so expressly."181 In the absence of an explicit exclusive remedy pro-
vision, the plaintiff should be allowed to elect either an administrative
remedy, a tort remedy in lieu of an administrative remedy, or a tort rem-
edy as a supplement to an administrative remedy.
82
Although administrative remedies have helped to fill the vacuum
created by the judiciary's reluctance to recognize a tort of retaliatory dis-
charge, claimants in some states have found these remedies to be inade-
quate.83 In Oregon, for example, claimants seeking administrative relief
have had to wait two to four years for a hearing.84 Disgruntled with the
administrative process, some legislatures have taken the fourth step in
74. 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981).
75. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34.15-39.1 (West Supp. 1985).
76. Lally, 85 N.J. at 670, 428 A.2d at 1318.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 670-71, 428 A.2d at 1318.
79. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 184, 384 N.E.2d at 358; Hernandez v. Home Educ. Livelihood
Program, Inc., 98 N.M. 125, 128, 645 P.2d 1381, 1384 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).
80. See, e.g., Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 161 Cal. App. 3d 402, 412, 207 Cal. Rptr.
663, 669 (1984).
81. Lally, 85 N.J. at 671, 428 A.2d at 1319.
82. Id. at 672, 428 A.2d at 1319. For further discussion of these various remedies, see
infra notes 252, 289-92 & accompanying text.
83. See generally Lally, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317.
84. Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 609, 588 P.2d 1087, 1093 (1978).
March 1986]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the development of the tort of retaliatory discharge by authorizing a stat-
utory tort action for equitable relief. For example, a bill was introduced
in Oregon that provided: "Any person claiming to be aggrieved by [a
retaliatory discharge] shall have a cause of suit to recover compensatory
damages, punitive damages and such further relief as will eliminate the
effects of [the discharge]." '8 5 There was keen opposition, however, to the
creation of a statutory tort action with a damages remedy.8 6 Employers
preferred the equitable remedies used to enforce Title VII. 87 As a result,
jurisdictions like Oregon now have enacted statutes providing that a re-
taliatory discharge victim may file a civil suit for injunctive relief and for
"such other equitable relief as may be appropriate, including but not lim-
ited to reinstatement ... with or without back pay."88 Such legislation
may provide that the filing of a civil suit constitutes an election of a judi-
cial remedy and a waiver of the right to file an administrative
complaint.89
Even legislation authorizing equitable relief for retaliatory dis-
charge, however, does not provide an adequate remedy for the wrong.
As the Oregon Supreme Court observed in Holien v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co.,90 Title VII and the imitative retaliatory discharge statutes fail to
capture the individualized nature of the injury suffered by a wrongfully
discharged employee. Neither general damages nor punitive damages are
recoverable under Title VII.91 Nor are such damages recoverable under
the relevant employment discrimination legislation enacted in Oregon. 92
The court noted that "[r]einstatement, back pay, and injunctions vindi-
cate the rights of the victimized group without compensating the plaintiff
for such personal injuries as anguish, physical symptoms of stress, a sense
85. See id. at 608, 588 P.2d at 1092.
86. Opposition is implied by the substantial changes made in the bill. See id. at 609, 588
P.2d at 1093.
87. Title VII provides:
[T]he court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may in-
clude, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay .... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
88. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.121 (1983); accord OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.90 (Page
1980) (relief limited to reinstatement with back pay and attorney's fees); VA. CODE § 65.1-40.1
(Supp. 1985) (authorizes not only reinstatement with back pay plus attorney's fees, but also
"actual damages").
89. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659.121(4) (1983).
90. 689 P.2d 1292 (Or. 1984).
91. See, e.g., Shah v. Mount Zion Hosp. & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir.
1981).
92. Holien, 689 P. 2d at 1305.
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of degradation, and the cost of psychiatric care." 93 Thus, the Oregon
court recognized that legal as well as equitable remedies are needed to
compensate adequately a wrongfully discharged plaintiff.
94
The inadequacy of purely equitable relief has led to the fifth phase in
the development of the tort of retaliatory discharge. In recent years, leg-
islatures in Connecticut, 95 North Carolina,96 Oklahoma, 97 and Texas
98
have enacted statutes that impose civil liability for retaliatory discharge,
authorizing both legal and equitable relief. For example, statutes in
North Carolina,99 Oklahoma, 1'0 and Texas m10 provide that an employer
shall be liable in a civil action "for reasonable damages suffered by an
employee" as a result of a retaliatory discharge. 02 These statutes also
provide that discharged employees "shall be entitled to be reinstated" to
their former positions.'
0 3
Despite the similarity in statutory language, courts in these states
remain at odds on the issue of punitive damages. The North Carolina
Court of Appeals ruled that punitive damages are not recoverable under
the above language because "[p]unitive damages, by their very nature,
are not damages 'suffered' by anyone."' 4 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court 0 5 reached a contrary conclusion. In Webb v. Dayton Tire & Rub-
ber Co.,106 the court observed that the Oklahoma statute authorized the
recovery of "reasonable damages," a term that gives "broad discretion"
to the court in determining the amount of recovery. 0 7 The court then
93. Id. at 1303.
94. Id. at 1303-04. The court held that the statute prohibiting punitive and emotional
distress damages in a discrimination case did not preclude plaintiff from recovering such dam-
ages in a separate cause of action for wrongful discharge. See also Crosby v. Saif Corp., 699
P.2d 198, 200 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (retaliatory discharge plaintiff allowed to proceed with a
common-law tort action for conspiracy to deprive him of workers' compensation benefits, de-
spite Oregon's statutory equitable remedy, which plaintiff did not invoke).
95. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-290a (West Supp. 1985).
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985).
97. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, §§ 5-6 (West Supp. 1985).
98. TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1986); see also MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 176.82 (West Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985).
100. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, §§ 5-6 (West Supp. 1985).
101. TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1986).
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, §§ 5-6 (West Supp.
1985); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1986).
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, §§ 5-6 (West Supp.
1985); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1986).
104. Buie v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 56 N.C. App. 445, 447, 289 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1982).
105. Webb v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 697 P.2d 519 (Okla. 1985).
106. 697 P.2d 519 (Okla. 1985).
107. Id. at 523.
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concluded that punitive damages should be available as a matter of pol-
icy: "In the absence of the deterrent effect of punitive damages, there
would be little to dissuade an employer from engaging in the practice of
discharging an employee for filing a [workers'] compensation claim."'
' 0 8
The Texas Supreme Court applied similar reasoning to find that the
phrase "reasonable damages" encompasses both future lost wages 0 9 and
damages for "inconvenience and mental anguish."' 10 The Texas court
has not yet ruled, however, on whether punitive damages are recoverable
under the statute. I
The final and most recent step in the development of the tort of
retaliatory discharge has been taken by the judiciary. In states that have
not enacted legislation authorizing both legal and equitable relief for vic-
tims of retaliatory discharge, some courts have begun to take the initia-
tive by creating a common-law tort action of retaliatory discharge."
2
For example, although the legislatures in Tennessee and Kansas have
refused to pass retaliatory discharge statutes,' '3 the courts in these states
have recognized a common-law retaliatory discharge action for legal
damages, including punitive damages in future cases. 14 In New Mexico,
although the judiciary at first deferred to the legislature to fashion a rem-
edy for retaliatory discharge,15 it later became impatient and created a
common-law tort action." 6 Because the judiciary had formulated the
employment at will doctrine, the New Mexico court reasoned that the
108. Id.
109. Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Tex. 1981).
110. Id. at 454-55.
111. Id. at 454-55 & n.7.
112. See, e.g., Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan.
App. 2d 488, 495-97, 630 P.2d 186, 192-93 (1981); Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613, 619 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1983); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tenn. 1984).
113. See Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App.
2d 488, 496, 630 P.2d 186, 192 (1981); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tenn.
1984).
114. See Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App.
2d 488, 496, 630 P.2d 186, 193 (1981); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tenn.
1984).
115. Bottijliso v. Hutchison Fruit Co., 96 N.M. 789, 796, 635 P.2d 992, 997-98 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1981) (dismissed on ground that recognition of a new cause of action for retaliatory
discharge is best addressed by the legislature); see also Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397
So. 2d 874, 876-77 (Miss. 1981) (deferring to legislature to create a statutory retaliatory dis-
charge action and recommending that Mississippi adopt the language of the Texas statute).
116. Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613, 619 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983). Although the court in Vigil
distinguished Bottijliso on the ground that Bottifliso was a retaliatory discharge action and not
a wrongful discharge action, the reasoning in Vigil clearly paves the way for directly overruling
BottUliso in the future.
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judiciary also could modify it.117 Courts1 18 that recently have created a
common-law retaliatory discharge action have relied on the public policy
implicit in workers' compensation legislation to override the employment
at will doctrine:
We know of no more effective way to nullify the basic purposes of
[a workers'] compensation system than to force employees to choose
between a continuation of employment or the submission of an indus-
trial claim .... It would not only frustrate the statutory scheme, but
also provide employers with an inequitable advantage if they were able
to intimidate employees with the loss of their jobs upon the filing of
claims for insurance benefits as a result of industrial injuries.1 19
Reviewing the evolution of the tort of retaliatory discharge, it is ap-
parent that statutes imposing criminal or civil penalties initially pro-
scribed employer misconduct.120 These statutes occasionally provided
the basis for judicial recognition of a common-law tort action, but courts
in most jurisdictions continued to adhere to the employment at will doc-
trine. As a result of this failure to provide judicial recourse for wrong-
fully discharged claimants, legislatures enacted administrative
remedies.121 While these remedies represented some improvement, they
sometimes proved to be inadequate.122 A few states then created a civil,
equitable cause of action for retaliatory discharge.123 More recently, sev-
eral state legislatures have enacted statutes authorizing both legal and
equitable relief.124 These statutes have inspired courts in other jurisdic-
tions to create a comparable common-law tort action based upon the pol-
icies implicit in workers' compensation legislation. 125 As stated by the
Kentucky Supreme Court12 6 when it recognized a retaliatory discharge
tort action, "the common law is not a stagnant pool but a 'mighty'
stream," and "[w]e should provide a remedy where the wrong and the
damages are clearly defined and commonly recognized."'
127
117. Id.
118. Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Ky. 1983) (finding implicit
in the state's workers' compensation statute the public policy that an employee has the right to
assert a lawful claim); Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 63, 675 P.2d 394, 396 (1984) (finding
in the workers' compensation law a clear public policy favoring economic security for injured
employees and concluding that to deny retaliatory discharge claim would nullify the basic
purpose of the law).
119. Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 64-65, 675 P.2d 394, 397 (1984).
120. See supra notes 38-63 & accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 64-82 & accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 83-84 & accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 85-94 & accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 95-111 & accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 112-19 & accompanying text.
126. Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983).
127. Id. at 733.
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Components of the Tort of Retaliatory Discharge
As evidenced by the legal developments chronicled above, a cause of
action for retaliatory discharge is evolving. Although the action has been
authorized legislatively in some jurisdictions 128 and judicially recognized
in others,129 it is uniformly described as a tort action.1 30 This part of the
Article discusses the elements of the prima facie case, including the spe-
cial problems surrounding the issue of the employer's motivation. It
then identifies the defenses most commonly asserted. Finally, it surveys
the spectrum of legal and equitable remedies that may be invoked to de-
ter and to compensate for the losses caused by retaliatory discharges.
The purpose of this section is not only to describe existing case law, but
also to recommend new directions for the future evolution of the retalia-
tory discharge action.
Prima Facie Case
A plaintiff who brings a cause of action for retaliatory discharge
must allege that the defendant-employer terminated the employee for an
improper reason.131 In the case of a workers' compensation claimant,
the plaintiff must allege that he or she was discharged in retaliation for
requesting workers' compensation benefits.1 32 In essence, the plaintiff's
position is that, although an employer may have the right to terminate
the employee at will, it may not do so for a retaliatory purpose.
1 33
Three basic elements of a prima facie case can be distilled from ex-
isting case law.1 34 First, the plaintiff must have exercised a statutory or
constitutional right.1 35 Second, the plaintiff must have been discharged.
And third, the plaintiff must prove some causal connection between the
128. See supra notes 95-98 & accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 112-19 & accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1282-85 (Ill. 1984) (tort
action not barred by collective bargaining agreement), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3513 (1985);
Scott v. Union Tank Car Co., 402 N.E.2d 992, 993 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (applying tort statute
of limitations); Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178, 182 (W. Va. 1980)
(applying tort statute of limitations).
131. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 475-78, 427 A.2d
385, 386-88 (1980) (retaliatory discharge action permissible when employee terminated for
compliance with state law). See generally Krauskopf, supra note 19, at 234.
132. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 253, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428
(1973).
133. Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 1977) (court finds "pur-
pose" irrelevant under at will doctrine).
134. See generally Krauskopf, supra note 19, at 243-49.
135. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
534-35 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing elements of Title VII retaliatory discharge action).
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exercise of the legal right and the discharge. 136 The cause of action is
described correctly as an "intentional" tort action. 137 The intent that
must be proven is an intent to terminate an employee who has exercised a
legally protected right. 138
With respect to the first element of the prima facie case, the courts
generally require proof that the plaintiff exercised a statutory or constitu-
tional right 139 because the practical effect of a retaliatory discharge ac-
tion is to restrict an employer's freedom to terminate an employee at will.
The courts are more comfortable imposing such a restriction when the
cause of action is premised on legislative policy.14°
Courts have differed in determining what constitutes the exercise of
a statutory right under workers' compensation legislation. 14' For exam-
ple, a few courts hold that, in order to state a cause of action, the plaintiff
must have filed a formal complaint for workers' compensation benefits
prior to the allegedly wrongful discharge.142 Such a rule may encourage
an employer to terminate an injured employee expeditiously, before the
employee has an opportunity to file a claim.143 A better approach, and
136. For a discussion of the various tests of causation that may be applied in determining
what motivated an employer to discharge an employee, see Brodin, The Standard of Causation
in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 292
(1982).
137. Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 285 S.E.2d 679, 682-83 (W. Va. 1981) (analogizing retalia-
tory discharge to constructive fraud for statute of limitations purposes).
138. Id. at 683.
139. See, ag., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 180-83, 384 N.E.2d 353, 356-58
(1978) (limits discussion to terminations that "undermine" workers' compensation statute);
Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983) (protection of employee should
not extend beyond "constitutionally protected activity" or public policy established by legisla-
tive determination). For a current case holding that employees of a private employer failed to
state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, see Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d 520,
478 N.E.2d 1354 (1985) (plaintiffs alleging a violation of first amendment unsuccessful due to
their failure to allege state action).
140. When the retaliatory discharge action is premised on a violation of workers' compen-
sation legislation, the federal courts have held that such an action may not be removed to
federal court due to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (1982), which provides that "[a] civil action in any
State court arising under the workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed
to any district court of the United States." Id.; see, e.g., Roberts v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc.,
597 F. Supp. 311 (D. Md. 1984) (retaliatory discharge case based on workers' compensation
legislation remanded to state court).
141. See generally Note, Tort Remedy, supra note 28; Note, Workmen's Compensation,
supra note 28, at 639-46.
142. See, e.g., Bryant v. Dayton Casket Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 367, 370-71, 433 N.E.2d 142,
144-45 (1982) (plaintiff must have taken some action that would constitute "actual pursuit of
his claim"); Genheimer v. Clark Grove Vault Co., 70 Ohio App. 2d 65, 68-69, 434 N.E.2d 744,
746-47 (1980) (requires plaintiff to have "filed a claim or instituted, pursued, or testified" in
workers' compensation proceeding at time of discharge).
143. For an excellent discussion of this problem, see Wolcowicz v. Intercraft Indus. Corp.,
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one more consistent with the informality of workers' compensation pro-
ceedings, would be a rule that allows a plaintiff to bring a retaliatory
discharge action if the injured employee has claimed, attempted to claim,
or expressed an intention to claim workers' compensation benefits.
144
This is the essence of the law in most jurisdictions that have considered
the question. 145 The specific formulations of the rule, however, vary.
Depending on the jurisdiction, an employee may sue for retaliatory dis-
charge if he or she has taken one or more of the following actions: filed a
claim or instituted proceedings; 146 instituted, or caused to be instituted,
in good faith, any proceeding; 147 claimed or attempted to claim bene-
fits; 148 filed a claim, hired a lawyer, or instituted in good faith any pro-
ceeding; 149 filed or made known an intention to file a claim; 150 received
or attempted to receive benefits;' 5' or suffered a work injury.152 A court
recognizing a common-law retaliatory discharge action should examine
the statutory formulations carefully and should adopt a rule that takes
478 N.E.2d 1039, 1042-43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Zaragosa v. Oneok, Inc., 700 P.2d 662, 665-66
(Okla. Ct. App. 1985).
144. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1986) (authorizing an administrative
remedy for retaliatory discharge).
145. E.g., Wolcowicz v. Intercraft Indus. Corp., 478 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985) (sufficient that plaintiff was discharged "because of his activities"); Delano v. City of
South Portland, 405 A.2d 222, 227 (Me. 1979) (formal filing of claim not required); Wright v.
Fiber Indus. Inc., 60 N.C. App. 486, 491, 299 S.E.2d 284, 287 (1983) (A discharge after plain-
tiff informed employer of intent to file claim is retaliatory discharge.); Webb v. Dayton Tire &
Rubber Co., 697 P.2d 519, 521 (Okla. 1985) (Receipt of temporary disability payments is
"institution of proceedings" so as to prohibit retaliatory discharge by employer.); Zaragosa v.
Oneok. Inc., 700 P.2d 662, 666 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985) (notice requirement satisfied when em-
ployer received written report from employee's physician); Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533
S.W.2d 111, 114-16 (Tex. 1976) (formal filing of claim not required).
146. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.237 (301)(11) (Callaghan Supp. 1985); see also LA. REV.
STAr. ANN. § 23:1361 (West Supp. 1985) ("plaintiff having asserted a claim ... for benefits");
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon Supp. 1986) ("exercising any of his rights"); OR. REV.
STAT. § 659.410 (1983) ("has applied for benefits or has invoked or utilized the procedures
provided for").
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985).
148. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-290a (West Supp. 1985) ("has filed a claim ... or
otherwise exercised the rights"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.205 (West 1981); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 39, § 111 (1984) ("asserting any claim under this act"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34.15-
39.1 (West Supp. 1985) ("claimed or attempted to claim benefits"); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW
§ 120 (McKinney Supp. 1986) ("claimed or attempted to claim compensation"); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 102.35 (West Supp. 1985).
149. TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1986); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85,
§ 5 (West Supp. 1985).
150. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1986); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.82
(West Supp. 1985) ("seeking benefits"); VA. CODE § 65.1-40.1 (Supp. 1985) ("intends to file or
has filed").
151. W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-1 (1985).
152. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 378-32(2) (Supp. 1984).
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into account the informality and policy objectives of workers' compensa-
tion proceedings.
The second element of the prima facie case for retaliatory discharge
is proof that the plaintiff was discharged.1 53 Although this element
seems quite simple and straightforward, in fact legislatures have had diffi-
culty describing the outer limits of the defendant's actionable conduct.
States that have recognized a civil remedy universally agree that a retali-
atory discharge is actionable. 154 At the other end of the spectrum, some
legislatures also allow a cause of action for "discrimination" against a
workers' compensation claimant.15 5 Between these two poles of the spec-
trum, legislatures have formulated varying descriptions of the conduct
that will make an employer liable: to discharge, threaten to discharge,
intimidate, or coerce an employee;156 to discharge or demote an em-
ployee; 157 to discharge, threaten to discharge, intentionally obstruct an
employee seeking workers' compensation benefits;158 to discharge, de-
mote, reassign, or take any punitive action against an employee; 159 and to
refuse to rehire an employee. 160 Courts recognizing a common-law tort
action have not yet addressed the question of what constitutes actionable
conduct by the employer.1 61
Courts. must balance competing policies in determining what con-
duct by theemployer is actionable. On one hand, the courts may want to
preserve'thi essence of the employment at will doctrine, and a restrictive
definition of the employer's actionable conduct advances that objec-
tive.1 62 On the other hand, the courts may want to promote the remedial
153. See generally Note, Workmen's Compensation, supra note 28.
154. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1361 (West Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
85, § 5 (West Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 65.1-40.1 (Supp. 1985).
155. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-290a
(West Supp. 1985); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.237 (301)(11) (Callaghan Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:15-39.1 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. WORK. COMp. LAW § 120 (McKinney Supp.
1986); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1986).
156. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.205 (West 1981); see also Sloan v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel., 505 F. Supp. 1085 (S.D. Fla. 1981) ("reduction of disability payments" not action-
able as retaliatory discharge).
157. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985).
158. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.82 (West Supp. 1985).
159. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.90 (Page 1980); see also Delano v. City of South
Portland, 405 A.2d 222, 228 (Me. 1979) (demotion is actionable as retaliatory
"discrimination").
160. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.35 (West Supp. 1985).
161. In Bryce v. Johnson & Johnson, 115 Ill. App. 3d 913, 921,450 N.E.2d 1235, 1240-41
(1983), the court held that the employer had neither explicitly nor constructively discharged
the plaintiff, making it unnecessary to discuss the issue of what constitutes actionable conduct
by the defendant in a common-law retaliatory discharge action.
162. See generally Krauskopf, supra note 19, at 232-34.
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purposes of workers' compensation legislation, and a liberal definition of
the actionable conduct advances this objective. 163 In all likelihood,
greater weight will be given to the compensatory objectives of workers'
compensation legislation as the courts develop case by case definitions of
the employer's actionable conduct in the common-law tort action.
The final issue with respect to the second element of the prima facie
case is the identity of the defendant. An employee is entitled to bring a
retaliatory discharge action against a current employer under even the
most restrictive statutory formulation. 164 But may a plaintiff bring an
action against an employer who has fired the plaintiff after learning that
the plaintiff had filed a workers' compensation claim against a former
employer? And may a plaintiff sue a duly authorized agent of the em-
ployer who has discharged the plaintiff on behalf of the employer? Both
of these questions have been answered affirmatively by some courts. Two
courts recently have ruled that if an employer fires a plaintiff after learn-
ing that the plaintiff had filed a workers' compensation claim against a
former employer, the court must recognize a cause of action for retalia-
tory discharge in order to facilitate the objectives of workers' compensa-
tion legislation. 165 Two courts have allowed claims to be filed against
duly authorized agents of the discharging employer. 166 In doing so, one
court reasoned that "it would distort normal tort doctrine, once a cause
of action is recognized, to impose liability on a wrongdoer's principal but
not on the wrongdoer." 167 The court further noted that holding the indi-
vidual wrongdoer responsible advances the goals of deterrence and com-
pensation, 16  particularly when the plaintiff is employed by a
governmental agency that enjoys immunity from suit, either under the
163. Id. at 243-45.
164. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.35(2)(3) (West Supp. 1985) ("Any employer...
who .... because of a claim or attempt to claim compensation benefits from such employer,
discriminates ... against an employee" shall be subject to an administrative proceeding.).
165. Darnell v. Impact Indus., Inc., 473 N.E.2d 935, 937 (Ill. 1984) ("To hold that the tort
of retaliatory discharge requires that the workers' compensation claim be made against the
discharging employer would seriously undermine the comprehensive statutory scheme which
provides 'for efficient and expeditious remedies for injured employees.' "); Goins v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 131 Mich. App. 185, 193-94, 347 N.W.2d 184, 189 (1983) ("The public policy extends
to situations such as this where the employee argues an unlawful or retaliatory discharge be-
cause he or she filed a workers' compensation claim against any employer, including a previous
employer.").
166. Zurek v. Hasten, 553 F. Supp. 745, 749 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (plaintiff stated a retaliatory
discharge claim against "officials and employees" of the Illinois Commerce Commission);
Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 493-
95, 630 P.2d 186, 191-92 (1981) (plaintiff stated a cause of action against individual officers
and employees of defendant city).
167. Zurek v. Hasten, 553 F. Supp. 745, 749 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
168. Id.
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eleventh amendment or under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 169 In
such circumstances, the individual wrongdoer may be the only defendant
from whom damages are recoverable.
170
The third element of the prima facie case is proof that the em-
ployer's conduct was motivated by unlawful considerations. The plaintiff
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence171 that the defendant
discharged the plaintiff for exercising a legal right and not for some other
reason.' 72 This element is particularly difficult to establish because the
plaintiff must prove a negative.1 73 The plaintiff's problems are com-
pounded if he or she is required to prove that retaliation was "the sole
reason" for the discharge.' 74 It is preferable to require the plaintiff to
prove that the filing of a workers' compensation claim was either "a sub-
stantial factor" or a "determinative factor"'175 in causing the discharge.
Under the "substantial" or "significant" factor test, the plaintiff
must prove that retaliation was an important factor motivating the dis-
charge. For example, if the plaintiff was discharged partly because she
filed a workers' compensation claim and partly because she often was
tardy, the plaintiff could obtain judicial relief for a retaliatory discharge
by proving that the filing of the claim was an important motivating fac-
169. Id. For a discussion of the eleventh amendment and the sovereign immunity doc-
trine, see W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER AND KEETON].
170. Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d
488, 493-94, 630 P.2d 186, 191 (1981) (observing that even a public official may be immune,
but only if the official has acted within the scope of his authority and in good faith); see supra
note 169.
171. See generally Note, Kelsay, supra note 28, at 859-61 (rejecting "clear and convinc-
ing" standard).
172. See, eg., Delano v. City of South Portland, 405 A.2d 222, 228-29 (Me. 1979) (Plain-
tiff must show that discharge was "rooted substantially or significantly" in the exercise of his
right.); Galante v. Sandoz, Inc., 192 N.L Super. 403, 407, 470 A.2d 45, 48 (1983) (Plaintiff
must show that employer had improper motive.).
173. Krauskopf, supra note 19, at 208.
174. See, eg., Sabine Pilot Serv. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. 1985) (Kilgarlin, J.,
concurring) (When discharged in retaliation for refusing to perform illegal act, plaintiff must
show this was "the only reason" for the discharge.); DeFord Lumber Co. v. Roys, 615 S.W.2d
235, 236-37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (There must be evidence from which jury can reasonably
infer that workers' compensation claim was "the sole reason" for the discharge.).
175. See, eg., Goins v. Ford Motor Co., 131 Mich. App. 185, 196-98, 347 N.W.2d 184,
190 (1983); see also Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)
(An employee need not show he was discharged "solely" on the basis of workers' compensa-
tion claim.). See generally Brodin, supra note 136, at 293.
The "substantial factor" test is favored by the second Restatement of Torts, which states:
"The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if his conduct is a substan-
tial factor in bringing about the harm .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431
(1965). For a discussion of the "substantial factor" and "but for" tests of causation in the
context of tort law, see PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 169, § 41.
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tor. Under the "determinative factor" test, the plaintiff must prove that
the employer would not have discharged plaintiff but for the filing of the
workers' compensation claim. In the above hypothetical, the plaintiff
could satisfy this test only by showing that she would not have been dis-
charged for tardiness alone. Under the "sole factor" test, the plaintiff
must prove that retaliation was the only reason for the discharge. In the
above hypothetical, the plaintiff would be entitled to judicial relief if she
proved that filing a workers' compensation claim was the only reason for
the discharge, and that the plaintiff's alleged tardiness in no way influ-
enced the employer's decision. Because employers often make decisions
for a variety of reasons, the "sole factor" test tends to insulate an em-
ployer from liability for retaliatory discharge. Thus, the "substantial fac-
tor" and the "determinative factor" tests are more effective in advancing
the objectives of both the workers' compensation scheme and the retalia-
tory discharge action.
Choosing between the "substantial factor" test and the "determina-
tive factor" test is more difficult. If a court were to adopt the "substan-
tial factor" test in the above hypothetical, it ultimately might order
reinstatement of a retaliatory discharge victim whose history of tardiness
had created problems for the employer in the past. In other words, the
"substantial factor" test might protect the victim of a retaliatory dis-
charge at the expense of an employer ordered to reinstate an employee
with a weak performance record. If a court were to adopt the "determi-
native factor" test, by contrast, the court could order reinstatement of
the employee only if the evidence showed that the plaintiff would not
have been discharged due to tardiness. The "determinative factor" test
thus would protect the employer against the reinstatement of a poor per-
former. At the same time, it would exonerate an employer who in fact
had shown disrespect for the legal rights of an employee who had filed a
workers' compensation claim.
Regardless of which test of motivation is selected, two problems
arise in obtaining evidence to probe the employer's motivation. 176 First,
direct evidence of the employer's state of mind is usually not available;
employees most often rely upon circumstantial evidence. Second, the
employer enjoys greater access to proof of its own reasons for employ-
ment decisions. In an effort to ease the resulting problems of proof in
workers' compensation cases, several courts have borrowed burden of
proof rules from employment discrimination cases decided under Title
176. Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11 th Cir. 1983). See generally
Note, Workmen's Compensation, supra note 28, at 645-46.
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VII. 177
Under Title VII, a plaintiff, who has the burden of persuasion on the
issue of discriminatory motive, is aided by a presumption that shifts the
burden of producing evidence on this issue to the defendant. 178 Courts
applying the Title VII presumption to retaliatory discharge cases have
held that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of retaliatory motive
by proving that the employee filed a workers' compensation claim, that
the employer had knowledge of the claim, and that the employer dis-
charged the employee. 179 Proof of these three facts creates a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the employee that precludes the court from
granting a motion for nonsuit or dismissal at the end of the plaintiff's
case. The burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate
a legitimate reason for the discharge. If the employer puts on no evi-
dence, the presumption requires that the fact finder must, if it believes
the plaintiff's evidence, rule in favor of the plaintiff. If the employer
submits relevant admissible evidence denying any retaliatory motive or
justifying its actions, the presumption is destroyed and the employee
must be given the opportunity to submit additional proof of retaliatory
177. See, e.g., Goins v. Ford Motor Co., 131 Mich. App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184 (1983)
(burden of proof on plaintiff to shoW that filing of workers' compensation claim significant
factor in discharge); Axel v. Duffy-M6tt Co., 47 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 389 N.E.2d 1075, 1079, 416
N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1979) (cites civil rights cases for proposition that burden shifts to defend-
ant after plaintiff makes prima facie showing of retaliatory motive). For a full discussion of the
burden of proof issue, see Davis v. Richmond Special Rd. Dist., 649 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983).
178. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56 (1981); McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
For a discussion of the proof of disparate treatment under Title VII, see B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 135, at 1286-322; Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimina-
tion Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1205 (1981); Brodin,
supra note 136; Cox, Substance and Process in Employment Discrimination Law: One View of
the Swamp, 18 VAL. U.L. Rv. 21 (1983); Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie
Case in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1979);
Furnish, Formalistic Solutions to Complex Problems: The Supreme Court's Analysis of Individ-
ual Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title VII, 6 IND. REL. L.J. 353 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Furnish, Formalistic Solutions]; Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. REv. 419
(1982); Kainen & Witherington, The Standards of Proof in Employment Discrimination Law,
57 CONN. B.J. 289 (1983); Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Dispa-
rate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1129 (1980); Player, The Evidentiary Nature of De-
fendant's Burden in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 49 Mo. L. REv. 17 (1984); Smith,
Employer Defenses in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Reassessment of Burdens of
Proof and Substantive Standards Following Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 372 (1982); Terrell, Employment Discrimination: The Defendant's Bur-
den, 29 Loy. L. REv. 287 (1983).
179. See, e.g., Axel v. Duffy-Mott Co., 47 N.Y.2d 1, 10, 389 N.E.2d 1075, 1079, 416
N.Y.S.2d 554, 558-59 (1979).
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motive or to show that the employer's asserted justification is merely a
pretext. At this point, the plaintiff bears both the burdens of production
and persuasion on the issue of retaliatory motive. If the plaintiff puts in
no further evidence, the defendant will be entitled to a directed verdict.
If the plaintiff does put in further evidence, the case will go to the fact
finder for a determination as to whether the plaintiff has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had a retaliatory
motive.
The presumption proposed in this Article' 80 is designed to assist the
plaintiff in proving that retaliation was one factor causing the discharge.
If the defendant claims no other motivation for the discharge, the plain-
tiff who has established the existence of a retaliatory motive is entitled to
judicial relief under any one of the substantive tests of motivation. 8 ' If
the defendant claims dual motives, however, the plaintiff must put in
additional evidence in order to establish liability for retaliatory dis-
charge. Under the "substantial factor" test, the plaintiff must prove that
retaliation was a significant motivating factor. 18 2 Under the "sole factor"
test, the plaintiff must establish that retaliation was the only motivating
factor. 83 And under the "determinative factor" test, the plaintiff must
show that he or she would not have been discharged but for the filing of
the workers' compensation claim.'
84
Most courts in labor law and employment discrimination cases have
adopted the "determinative factor" test of motivation when faced with
an employer's claim of dual motives. 85 Instead of placing the burden of
persuasion on the employee to prove that retaliation was the determina-
tive factor, however, these courts generally place the burden of persua-
sion on the employer to prove that the employer "would have reached
the same decision even if, hypothetically, he had not been motivated by a
desire to punish plaintiff" for exercising a legal right 186
180. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 n.5 (1983).
181. See supra note 179 & accompanying text.
182. Brodin, supra note 136, at 293.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983); Bell v.
Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552 (1lth Cir. 1983). But see Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d
1318 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (articulating a "discernable factor" test of motivation in finding
that the defendant was liable; ordering the trial court to apply a "same decision" test of causa-
tion in fashioning the appropriate remedy). See generally Furnish, Formalistic Solutions, supra
note 178.
186. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983). One court
has suggested the adoption of this approach in workers' compensation retaliatory discharge
actions. Axel v. Duffy-Mott Co., 47 N.Y.2d 1, 10, 389 N.E.2d 1075, 1079, 416 N.Y.S.2d 554,
558-59 (1979); see infra notes 216-24 & accompanying text.
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There are two typical procedural mechanisms for placing the burden
of persuasion on the defendant. One is to create an affirmative defense,
which is the approach taken by the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") in dual motive cases.18 7 The other is to create a presumption
regarding an issue in the plaintiff's prima facie case that shifts the burden
of persuasion to the defendant.188 The usual justifications for creating
such a presumption are that the defendant has greater access to the evi-
dence or that the defendant is a wrongdoer and should bear the risk of
nonpersuasion 1 89 Both justifications are applicable in a retaliatory dis-
charge action. Once the plaintiff has proven that retaliation was one fac-
tor motivating the discharge, the defendant certainly has greater access
to the evidence establishing that the discharge was based primarily on a
legitimate motive. And if the plaintiff has proven a retaliatory motive,
the defendant has violated the spirit of the workers' compensation law
and should be required to bear the risk of nonpersuasion on the "dual
motive" justification.
Regardless of which test of causation a court adopts, and regardless
of which rules the courts select to govern the burden of proof, employers
will advance a variety of justifications for an employee's discharge..
These include absenteeism, 190 a concern that the employee will aggravate
or reactivate a work-related injury,1 91 and a belief that the employee is
unable to perform the assigned duties.192 Other common justifications
are a general recession 193 or an economic slump in the employer's trade
or business.'
94
Sometimes it is relatively simple for the employee to prove that the
employer's justification is a pretext. In one case, for example, the em-
ployer had had a written policy to fire anyone who filed a lawsuit against
187. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
188. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 169, §§ 38, 40-41, 52 (discussing
the use of presumptions to shift the burden of persuasion on the issues of negligence (res ipsa
loquitur doctrine), causation, and apportionment of damages); Mendez, supra note 178.
189. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 169, §§ 38, 40-41, 52, at 239-42, 258-59, 270-71,
350-51.
190. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Addressograph Multigraph Corp., 87 Ill. App. 3d 396, 398,
409 N.E.2d 89, 90 (1980); Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 419 Mich. 356, 359, 353 N.W.2d
469, 470 (1984); Mitchell v. St. Louis County, 575 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978);
Wilson v. Riverside Hosp., 18 Ohio St. 3d 8, 9, 479 N.E.2d 275, 276 (1985).
191. See, ag., Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 650, 245 N.W.2d 151, 154
(1976) (Allen, J., concurring).
192. See, eg., McKiness v. Western Union Tel. Co., 667 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984).
193. See, e.g., Brewster v. C.H. Liebfried Mfg. Corp., 65 A.D.2d 162, 164, 411 N.Y.S.2d
413, 414 (1978).
194. See, eg., Smith v. Mallory Timers Co., 97 A.D.2d 571, 468 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1983).
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the company. 195 Although the employer removed this directive from the
employee handbook prior to the plaintiff's discharge, the employee was
able to prove that the policy in fact had been continued informally.196 In
other cases of alleged pretext, the evidence is sparse, and it is difficult for
the fact finder to ascertain the true cause of the discharge. 97 To counter
this difficulty, one court has recommended that, in the future, the em-
ployer set forth reasons in writing in order to establish clearly that "no
attempt was made to dissuade the injured employee from filing a claim"
and that the discharge was "in no way retaliatory."' 198
Some courts have responded favorably to employers' asserted justifi-
cations for discharging employees. In the New York case of Brewster v.
C.H. Liebfried Manufacturing Corp.,199 for example, the court held that
the employee was discharged "because of a lack of work and general
economic conditions. '' 200 The court cautioned that "[d]iscrimination
works both ways and, while discrimination against employees who file
compensation claims should not be countenanced, the allegation of dis-
crimination should not become a sword without just cause.
''2
01
Many employers have attempted to strengthen their position on the
issue of motivation by adopting company policies regarding such matters
as absenteeism. Their theory is that the discharge of an injured employee
for absenteeism will be justified more clearly by the existence of an ex-
plicit company rule. At first, the courts tended to regard these policies as
"irrelevant. ' 20 2 More recently, however, courts20 3 and legislatures 2°4
have given greater weight to proof of an employee's violation of a valid
company policy. In the words of a New Jersey court, "to preclude the
195. Collier v. Pellerin Milnor Corp., 463 So. 2d 47, 48-49 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
196. Id.
197. E.g., Ducote v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 471 So. 2d 704, 706-07 (La. 1985) (judgment
for plaintiff affirmed); Axel v. Duffy-Mott Co., 47 N.Y.2d 1, 389 N.E.2d 1075, 416 N.Y.S.2d
554 (1979) (judgment for plaintiff affirmed).
198. Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 650-51, 245 N.W.2d 151, 154-55 (1976)
(Allen, J., concurring).
199. 65 A.D.2d 162, 411 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1978).
200. Id. at 164, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Lo Dolce v. Regional Transit Serv., 77 A.D.2d 697, 429 N.Y.S.2d 505
(1980); accord Griffin v. Eastman Kodak Co., 80 A.D.2d 689, 436 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1981).
203. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Addressograph Multigraph Corp., 87 IlI. App. 3d 396, 397-
98, 409 N.E.2d 89, 90-91 (1980) (discharge was not retaliatory, but for failure to report ab-
sence); Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 419 Mich. 356, 360, 353 N.W.2d 469, 471 (1984)
(Workers' compensation law does not prohibit discharge for injury-related absence.); Galante
v. Sandoz, Inc., 192 N.J. Super. 403, 407-09, 470 A.2d 45, 47-48 (1983) (Workers' compensa-
tion law does not preclude the neutral application of an absence control policy.).
204. E.g., N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 120 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
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neutral application of an absence control policy by an employer to an
employee who was once injured in a work-related accident is to confer
upon the employee a benefit not contemplated by the legislature; namely,
unlimited absences from work with impunity. '20 5 The court emphasized
that if an employee were fired after one absence resulting from a work-
related injury, "such an eventuality would smack more of a retaliatory
response. ' 20 6 As the instances of absence begin to multiply, however,
"the likelihood of evidence supporting a retaliatory firing may begin to
dissipate substantially.
'20 7
Some jurisdictions, either by judicial decision 2 8 or by statute,
20 9
have attempted to strike a balance between the needs of the injured em-
ployee and the employer. These jurisdictions have provided that a
worker who has sustained a compensable injury shall be reinstated upon
demand, "provided that the position is available and the worker is not
disabled from performing the duties of such position." 210 These provi-
sions contrast with the original language of the North Carolina statute:
"The failure of an employer to continue to employ.., an employee who
receives compensation for permanent disability, total or partial, shall in
no manner be deemed a violation of this [retaliatory discharge] sec-
tion." 211 This language, in effect, treats all recipients of permanent partial
disability benefits as a class, removing from them the protection of the
retaliatory discharge statute, even though many individuals within the
class may be capable of continuing to work.212 The North Carolina legis-
205. Galante v. Sandoz, Inc., 192 N.J. Super. 403, 409, 470 A.2d 45, 48 (1983) (summary
judgment for employer). In Galante, the court also said that "[u]ntil the legislature requires,
as a matter of policy, that absences related to on the job injuries must be recognized as excused
lost time, the employee is left to pursuing the remedy of showing that he is the victim of a
retaliatory dismissal." Id. at 412, 470 A.2d at 50.
206. Id. at 411, 470 A.2d at 49.
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 658,
664, 586 P.2d 564, 569, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250, 255 (1978).
209. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 659.121, .410, .415, .420 (1983). In Shaw v. Doyle Mill-
ing Co., 297 Or. 251, 255, 683 P.2d 82, 83-84 (1984), the court construed the Oregon statute to
require reinstatement of an employee two years after his injury. The court emphasized that the
statute was part of a broader legislative scheme to afford employment opportunity and security
to the handicapped.
210. OR. REv. STAT. § 659.415 (1983); see also HAWAII REv. STAT. § 378-32(2) (Supp.
1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34.15-39.1 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 120 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 5 (West Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.35 (West Supp. 1985).
211. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1(e) (1979).
212. The legislative history behind the enactment of the North Carolina statute is chroni-
cled in Note, Workmen's Compensation, supra note 28, at 644 & n.10.
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lature amended its statute in 1985 to correct this problem. 2 13 The statute
now provides: "The failure of an employer to continue to employ.., an
employee who receives compensation for ... a permanent partial disabil-
ity interfering with his ability to adequately perform work available, shall
in no manner be deemed a violation of this section. '21 4 Thus North Car-
olina has joined the trend toward requiring reinstatement of a previously
injured worker, provided the worker is qualified to perform the job.
Defenses
The most frequently asserted defenses to a retaliatory discharge ac-
tion are the statute of limitations and preemption by federal labor laws or
preclusion by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 2 15 North
Carolina's retaliatory discharge statute is unique because it establishes
"affirmative defenses" based on the employee's misconduct. 2 16 The stat-
ute provides:
Any employer shall have as an affirmative defense to this section
the following: willful or habitual tardiness or absence from work or
being disorderly or intoxicated while at work, or destructive of an em-
ployer's property; or for failure to meet employer work standards not
related to the Workers' Compensation claim; or malingering; or em-
bezzlement or larceny of employer's property; or for violating specific
written company policy of which the employee has been previously
warned and for which the action is a stated remedy of such
violation.
217
These "affirmative defenses" overlap with some of the employer's
"justifications" for discharging an employee discussed above under the
issue of motivation.2 18 If the plaintiff's misconduct is characterized as an
affirmative defense, the employer has the burdens of pleading and persua-
sion on the issue of whether there was a legitimate reason for the dis-
charge.2 1 9 The successful assertion of an affirmative defense precludes
the plaintiff from establishing liability. By contrast, if the plaintiff's mis-
conduct is regarded as relevant to the issue of motivation, which is part
of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the plaintiff has the burdens of plead-
213. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1(e) (1985).
214. Id.
215. See infra notes 225-51 & accompanying text. The exclusive remedy clause of a work-
ers' compensation statute is a defense only if the statute creates a civil remedy for retaliatory
discharge and makes it the workers' exclusive remedy. See supra notes 54-56, 70-82 & accom-
panying text.
216. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1(c) (1985).
217. Id.
218. See supra notes 190-94 & accompanying text.
219. Note, Workmen's Compensation, supra note 28, at 645.
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ing and persuasion. 220 Of course, either burden may be shifted to the
employer through the use of presumptions on the ground that the em-
ployer has greater access to the evidence regarding the issues of
motivation.
221
It is true that the National Labor Relations Board, like the North
Carolina legislature, has created an affirmative defense to deal with an
employer's claim that there was a legitimate reason for discharging an
employee.222 Tort law, however, usually creates presumptions to place
the burden of persuasion on the defendant regarding an issue that is part
of the plaintiff's prima facie case.223 For that reason, this Article recom-
mends the use of presumptions rather than affirmative defenses to regu-
late the burden of persuasion on issues relevant to the employer's
motivation.
In the event that an employer is granted an affirmative defense on
the issue of justification, however, it is important to note the relationship
between the proposed affirmative defense and the substantive test of mo-
tivation.224 For example, under the North Carolina statute, the em-
ployer may establish an affirmative defense simply by proving that the
plaintiff's misconduct was one factor motivating the discharge. The ef-
fect of this language is to adopt the "sole factor" test of motivation,
which conditions liability on a finding that retaliation was the only factor
motivating the discharge. It would have been preferable for the North
Carolina legislature to have couched its affirmative defense in the lan-
guage of either the "determinative factor" or the "substantial factor"
test. Under the "determinative factor" test of motivation, the legislature
should have provided that the employer could avoid liability by proving
that the employer would have discharged the employee for one of the
statutory justifications, even if the employee had not filed a workers'
compensation claim. And under the "substantial factor" test, the legisla-
ture should have exonerated the employer from liability upon proof that
one or more of the statutory justifications was such a significant reason
for the discharge that the filing of the workers' compensation claim was
no more than a minor factor.
Every jurisdiction recognizes the statute of limitations as an affirma-
220. See supra notes 171-73 & accompanying text. In other words, the plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the misconduct was insufficient to justify the
discharge.
221. See supra notes 178-79, 188-89 & accompanying text.
222. See supra note 187 & accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 188-89 & accompanying text.
224. The various substantive tests of motivation are defined supra notes 174-75 & accom-
panying text.
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tive defense. The critical issue concerns which statute of limitations
should be applied to a retaliatory discharge action. If the action is
brought under the common law, courts must choose between a contract
and a tort statute of limitations. The courts have uniformly applied a
tort statute of limitations. 225 One dissenting judge in Indiana, however,
has argued that the contract statute of limitations should apply on the
theory that workers' compensation legislation is a mandatory term of
every employment contract. 226 The tort statute of limitations is appro-
priate because the cause of action is intended to punish the defendant for
violating the spirit of workers' compensation legislation as well as to
compensate the employee for his or her resulting losses, including
noneconomic losses.227 As a general rule, neither punitive damages nor
general damages for nonphysical harm are recoverable in a breach of
contract action.
228
Assuming that a tort statute of limitations should apply, a court also
must determine whether the case is controlled by the statute governing
"personal injury" actions or by a longer statute of limitations governing
other types of tort actions. The courts uniformly have refused to apply
the personal injury statute on the ground that the harm caused by a retal-
iatory discharge is not primarily a personal injury, but rather an "eco-
nomic" 229 and "emotional" loss.
230
Employers have been concerned about the relatively long statutes of
limitations governing common-law retaliatory discharge actions. As a
result, some legislatures that have created a statutory cause of action or
an administrative remedy have enacted shorter statutes of limitations. In
California, for example, the employee must claim an administrative rem-
edy within one year from the date of the employee's termination.23' In
Ohio and North Carolina, employees must file statutory causes of action
225. Scott v. Union Tank Car Co., 402 N.E.2d 992, 993 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Arvie v.
Century Tel. Enter., Inc., 452 So. 2d 392, 394 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Shanholtz v. Monongahela
Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178, 182 (W. Va. 1980).
226. Scott v. Union Tank Car Co., 402 N.E.2d 992, 993-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (Staton,
J., dissenting).
227. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 181-88, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357-60 (1978); Lally
v. Copygraphics, Inc., 173 N.J. Super. 162, 179-81, 413 A.2d 960, 968-69 (1980), aff'd, 85 N.J.
668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981); Webb v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 697 P.2d 519, 522-23 (Okla.
1985); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tenn. 1984).
228. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.4, at 817-21 (1973).
229. Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 285 S.E.2d 679, 682-83 (W. Va. 1981) (characterizing
retaliatory discharge as analogous to a fraud action).
230. Brown v. Physicians Mut. Ins. Co., 679 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (Plain-
tiff's complaint prayed for mental anguish damages as well as lost earnings.).
231. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1986).
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within six months232 and one year,233 respectively. In Hawaii, the em-
ployee must claim an administrative remedy within thirty days of the
discharge, or thirty days after the employee learns of the discharge, ex-
cept that the employee who is discharged while still unable to work also
may file a complaint within thirty days of the date the employee is able to
return to work.
234
The other affirmative defenses most often raised in retaliatory dis-
charge actions are preemption by federal labor laws and preclusion by
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.235 Recent decisions,
however, uniformly have rejected these defenses in actions by workers'
compensation claimants.
2 36
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") provides that em-
ployees shall have "the right ... to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection .... -237 The NLRA also provides that it shall be an unfair
232. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.90 (Page 1980).
233. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1(f) (1985).
234. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 378-33(b) (Supp. 1984).
235. See generally Pincus & Gillman, The Common Law Contract and Tort Rights of
Union Employees: What Effect After the Demise of the "At Will"Doctrine?, 59 CHI.[-]KENT L.
REV. 1007 (1983); Silzer, Workers' Compensation: Retaliatory Discharge of Employees Covered
by a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 70 ILL. B.J. 164 (1981); Comment, State Actions for
Wrongful Discharge: Overcoming Barriers Posed by Federal Labor Law Preemption, 71 CALIF.
L. REv. 942 (1983); Comment, NLRA Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Claims, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1983); Annot., 32 A.L.R.4TH 350 (1984) (failure to pursue or exhaust
remedies under union contract as affecting employee's right of state civil action for retaliatory
discharge).
236. See, eg., Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309, 1316, 1320 (10th Cir. 1982)
(Oklahoma statute not preempted by federal law and action under statute not precluded by
collective bargaining agreement); Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.,
22 Cal. 3d 658, 665, 586 P.2d 564, 568, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250, 254 (1978) (employer claim of
preclusion by collective bargaining agreement "specious" when union regularly waived provi-
sions with respect to injured workers); Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 161 Cal. App. 3d 402,
412, 207 Cal. Rptr. 663, 669 (1984) (no preemption by 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) in absence of
"concerted activity"); Puchert v. Agsalud, 67 Hawaii 25, 29-33, 677 P.2d 449, 455-56 (1984)
(rejecting claims of federal preemption and preclusion by agreement), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Pan Am. World Airways v. Puchert, 105 S. Ct. 2693 (1985); Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago,
Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (Ill. 1984) (tort remedy of retaliatory discharge not precluded by
existence of contract remedy provided by collective bargaining agreement), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 3513 (1985); Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Tex. 1981) (no preclusion
by collective bargaining agreement when employer "ignored" agreement in handling grievance
claim and no settlement was reached on grievance). But see Herring v. Prince Foods-Canning
Div., 611 F. Supp. 177, 181 (D.C.N.J. 1985) (predicting that New Jersey Supreme Court
would require exhaustion of arbitration procedures, but failing to discuss and distinguish
above-cited cases).
237. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
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labor practice for an employer to interfere with an employee's exercise of
these rights.238 When an activity is even arguably protected or prohib-
ited under the NLRA, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that
state law may not govern that activity. 239 The question is whether filing
a workers' compensation claim is a "concerted activity" within the
meaning of the NLRA, and, if so, whether discharging an employee who
has filed a workers' compensation claim is an interference with the exer-
cise of that activity.2
40
For some time, the National Labor Relations Board took the posi-
tion that pursuit of a workers' compensation claim was "constructive
concerted activity" because workers' compensation benefits arise out of
the employment relationship and are of common interest to other em-
ployees.241 In 1984, the NLRB abandoned the "constructive concerted
activity" theory, however, and adopted in its place a test that requires
proof of actual concerted activity. 242 Consequently, in Meyer v. Byron
Jackson, Inc. ,243 a California appellate court held that the NLRA did not
preempt the plaintiff's state law cause of action for retaliatory discharge
because the plaintiff was not engaged in a concerted activity. 244 Two fed-
eral courts of appeals now have ordered the NLRB to reexamine its lit-
eral test of concerted activity. 245 It remains to be seen whether the Board
will adopt a test of concerted activity that preempts the filing of state law
retaliatory discharge actions or whether the Board will allow the states to
238. Id. § 158(a)(1).
239. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
240. Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 161 Cal. App. 3d 402, 411, 207 Cal. Rptr. 663, 668
(1984) (citing NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1507 (1984)).
241. Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 161 Cal. App. 3d 402, 411-12, 207 Cal. Rptr. 663, 668-
69 (1984) (citing Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1979), enforcement de-
nied, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980)).
242. Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 161 Cal. App. 3d 402, 412, 207 Cal. Rptr. 663, 669
(1984) (citing Meyers Indus., Inc. & Kenneth Prill, 268 N.L.R.B. 73 (1984), rev'd sub nom.
Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). The Meyers decision subsequently was re-
versed and remanded for reconsideration of the phrase "concerted activity" in Prill v. NLRB,
755 F.2d 941, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also Ewing v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1985).
Neither Prill nor Ewing involved an employee who had been discharged for filing a workers'
compensation claim.
243. 161 Cal. App. 3d 402, 207 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1984).
244. Id. at 412, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 669; see also Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309,
1316 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying Oklahoma's workers' compensation law).
245. Meyer, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 412, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 669; see supra note 242. Recent
commentary discussing the meaning of concerted activity includes Bethel, Constructive Con-
certed Activity Under the NLRA: Conflicting Signals from the Court and the Board, 59 IND.
L.J. 583 (1984); Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert" Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 286 (1981); Recent Development, The
Supreme Court Takes One Step Forward and the NLRB Takes One Step Backward: Redefining
Constructive Concerted Activities, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1295 (1985).
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develop remedies to deter employers from abusing their power over indi-
vidual employees who are asserting state-created legal rights.
If a plaintiff claiming retaliatory discharge is a union member cov-
ered by a collective bargaining agreement, the employer may contend
that the plaintiff is required to pursue the grievance remedies provided by
the agreement.2 46 But the courts generally have held that a collective
bargaining agreement does not bar an employee's tort action for retal-
iatory discharge.2 47 In Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc. ,248 the Illinois
Supreme Court observed that a union employee's grievance usually will
go to arbitration. If the arbitrator finds no just cause for the employee's
discharge, the remedy simply will be reinstatement and an award of back
pay. The arbitrator is not empowered to award punitive damages.
2 49
Therefore, the court ruled that the action for retaliatory discharge could
go forward despite the collective bargaining agreement: "If there is no
possibility that an employer can be liable in punitive damages, not only
has the employee been afforded an incomplete remedy, but there is no
available sanction against a violator of an important public policy of this
State. 250 The court also took the position that it would be unreasonable
to immunize from punitive damages an employer who unjustly dis-
charges a union employee, while allowing the imposition of punitive




The tort of retaliatory discharge takes place within the context of an
employment relationship, and therefore the remedies should reflect the
policies of tort and contract law. Both legal and equitable remedies
should be available so that the plaintiff may request reinstatement in ad-
dition to compensatory and punitive damages. Furthermore, because the
tort arises in the context of workers' compensation legislation, a wrong-
fully discharged claimant should have a right to an administrative rem-
edy. That remedy could be available either in lieu of, or in addition to,
the tort action.252
246. Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 118 Ill. App. 3d 7, 8,454 N.E.2d 1092, 1093 (1983),
aff'd, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (Ill. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3513 (1985).
247. See supra note 236.
248. 473 N.E.2d 1280 (Ill. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3513 (1985).
249. Id. at 1284.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1283-84.
252. For a discussion of alternative and cumulative tort actions, see Love, Actions for Non-
physical Harm: The Relationship Between the Tort System and No-Fault Compensation (With
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There has been little judicial discussion of potential remedies for the
tort of retaliatory discharge.253 Most appellate courts simply have not
been asked to consider the issue because most of the cases they have
heard have involved preliminary issues, such as whether the plaintiff's
complaint states a cause of action254 and, if so, whether the claim is
barred by a statute of limitations255 or preempted by federal labor law. 256
The states that have enacted statutory causes of action have been
forced to consider the remedies issues.257 A few states have authorized
only legal relief.258 For example, Minnesota's retaliatory discharge stat-
ute provides for "a civil action for damages incurred by the employee...,
including attorney fees" and punitive damages "not to exceed three times
the amount of any compensation benefit to which the employee is enti-
tled. '259 Other states have authorized only the equitable remedy of rein-
statement with back pay.260 A more recent trend is to provide for both
reinstatement with back pay and "reasonable" 261 or "actual" damages.262
Connecticut's statute, which became effective in 1984, provides the most
comprehensive remedial scheme.263 It creates a civil cause of action for
both legal and equitable relief or, in the alternative, an administrative
remedy. Because of its comprehensiveness, Connecticut's statute most
an Emphasis on Workers' Compensation), 73 CALIF. L. REV. 857 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
Love, Actions]; Love, Punishment and Deterrence: A Comparative Study of Tort Liability for
Punitive Damages Under No-Fault Compensation Legislation, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 231 (1983).
253. For cases that have discussed the remedies issue in some depth, see Malik v. Apex
Int'l Alloys, Inc., 762 F.2d 77, 80-81 (10th Cir. 1985); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172,
186-90, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359-61 (1978); Wojciak v. Northern Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675,
679-81 (Minn. 1981); Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 453-55 (Tex. 1981).
254. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 249-50, 297 N.E.2d 425,
426 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 646, 245 N.W.2d 151, 152 (1976).
255. See supra notes 225-34 & accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 237-51 & accompanying text.
257. The following statutes define civil remedies for statutory retaliatory discharge actions:
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-290a (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.82 (West
Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1
(1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.90 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 6 (West
Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.121, .410, .415, .420 (1983); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c
(Vernon Supp. 1986); VA. CODE § 65.1-40.1 (Supp. 1985).
258. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.82 (West Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon
Supp. 1986).
259. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.82 (West Supp. 1985).
260. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.90 (Page 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.121, .410,
.415, .420 (1983).
261. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, §§ 5-6 (West Supp.
1985); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1986).
262. VA. CODE § 65.1-40.1 (Supp. 1985).
263. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-290a (West Supp. 1985).
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successfully has accomplished the objectives of providing a plaintiff with
the full panoply of legal and equitable relief.
The Connecticut statute provides:
(a) No employer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter
shall discharge, or cause to be discharged, or in any manner discrimi-
nate against any employee because the employee has filed a claim for
workers' compensation benefits or otherwise exercised the rights af-
forded to him pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
(b) Any employee who is so discharged or discriminated against
may either: (1) Bring a civil action in the superior court for the judi-
cial district where the employer has its principal office for the reinstate-
ment of his previous job, payment of back wages and reestablishment
of employee benefits to which he would have otherwise been entitled if
he had not been discriminated against or discharged and any other
damages caused by such discrimination or discharge. The court may
also award punitive damages. Any employee who prevails in such a
civil action shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs to be
taxed by the court; or (2) file a complaint with the chairman of the
workers' compensation commission alleging violation of the provisions
of subsection (a) of this section. Upon receipt of any such complaint,
the chairman shall select a commissioner to hear the complaint, pro-
vided any commissioner who has previously rendered any decision
concerning the claim shall be excluded. The hearing shall be held in
the workers' compensation district where the employer has its princi-
pal office. After the hearing, the commissioner shall send each party a
written copy of his decision. The commissioner may award the em-
ployee the reinstatement of his previous job, payment of back wages
and reestablishment of employee benefits to which he otherwise would
have been eligible if he had not been discriminated against or dis-
charged. Any employee who prevails in such a complaint shall be
awarded reasonable attorney's fees. Any party aggrieved by the deci-
sion of the commissioner may appeal the decision to the appellate
court.
2 6 4
The Connecticut statute authorizes the plaintiff to obtain legal relief
in the form of compensatory and punitive damages. The compensatory
damages include both economic losses, such as back wages and employee
benefits, and "other damages," which presumably include damages for
emotional distress and other noneconomic losses.
In assessing economic losses, the courts should be attuned to the
measure of recovery for the breach of an employment contract.265 Even
though the cause of action lies in tort, the primary economic loss is
264. Id.
265. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 228, § 12.25, at 924-31; Eisenberg, The Respon-
sive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1107 (1984). The employment contract can be
express or implied.
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caused by the employer's termination of the employment contract. 266
Therefore, the plaintiff should be entitled to receive whatever sums
would have been due under the express or implied employment contract
from the date of discharge to the time of trial.2 67 If the plaintiff's em-
ployment contract is for a specified term, and if the court does not grant
reinstatement, the plaintiff also should receive future lost wages, reduced
to present value.268 In addition, the plaintiff should be entitled to recover
the value of lost employment benefits and any other consequential eco-
nomic losses caused by the breach, such as expenses related to finding
new employment and moving expenses. 269 The employer should have the
burden of asserting that the plaintiff could have mitigated his or her dam-
ages. 270 If the plaintiff has obtained a substitute job, the plaintiff's dam-
ages should be offset by the proceeds from that job.2 7 1
Plaintiffs also should be able to recover compensatory damages for
noneconomic losses. These damages should be assessed in accord with
tort precedents. 272 Thus, a plaintiff who experiences mental anguish, hu-
miliation, or emotional distress due to the retaliatory discharge should be
entitled at least to actual damages, 273 and perhaps to presumed damages
for the dignitary wrong as well. 274 The plaintiff should not be required to
prove resulting physical manifestations of emotional distress because re-
266. See Annot., 44 A.L.R.4TH 1131 (1986).
267. The primary component of this loss is back pay. See, e.g., Meyer v. Byron Jackson,
Inc., 161 Cal. App. 3d 402, 409-10, 207 Cal. Rptr. 663, 667-68 (1984); Shaw v. Doyle Milling
Co., 297 Or. 251, 254, 683 P.2d 82, 83 (1984).
268. The primary component of this relief is known as front pay. See, e.g., Carnation Co.
v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 453-54 (Tex. 1981).
269. Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1285 (Ill. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 3513 (1985); Collier v. Pellerin Milnor Corp., 463 So. 2d 47, 49-50 (La. Ct. App. 1985);
Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613, 620 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
270. For a discussion of the policy considerations that justify placing the burden of proof
on the employer, see D. DOBBS, supra note 228, § 12.25, at 924-25.
271. See, e.g., Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 161 Cal. App. 3d 402, 207 Cal. Rptr. 663
(1984); Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); DeFord Lumber Co. v. Roys, 615
S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). For a discussion of the employee's measure of dam-
ages in a wrongful discharge action, see Harrison, Wrongful Discharge: Toward a More Effi-
cient Remedy, 56 IND. L.J. 207 (1981).
272. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 228, §§ 7.1, .3, at 509-10, 528-32.
273. See, e.g., Malik v. Apex Int'l Alloys, Inc., 762 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1985) (applying
Oklahoma law and affirming verdict for actual damages); Meyer v. Byron Jackson. Inc., 161
Cal. App. 3d 402, 207 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1984) (affirming verdict for emotional distress damages);
Boyles v. Greater Peoria Mass Transit, 133 Ill. App. 3d 588, 479 N.E.2d 7 (1985) (allowing
compensatory damages to be recovered in tort because tort damages allow for greater recovery
than labor law remedies).
274. For a discussion of presumed damages for dignitary wrongs, see Love, Damages: A
Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1242 (1979).
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taliatory discharge, by definition, is an intentional tort action.275 The
proper analogy is to the action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and not to the action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.
276
Finally, punitive damages should be recoverable by the retaliatory
discharge claimant. 277 Compensatory awards often are small, 278 and one
of the most important functions of the retaliatory discharge tort is to
punish the employer for past misconduct and to deter future miscon-
duct.279 Virtually every jurisdiction that has recognized the retaliatory
discharge action has authorized the recovery of punitive damages.280 To
date, however, most jurisdictions have not actually assessed punitive
damages against the defendant on the ground that the defendant had no
advance warning that its conduct would be characterized as tortious.
28 1
Compensatory and punitive damages do not constitute adequate
remedies if the plaintiff desires reinstatement. Therefore, in addition to
these legal remedies, the Connecticut statute authorizes the claimant to
seek equitable relief.282 The traditional rule is that equity wil not order
specific performance of a personal service contract.283 That rule is not
enforced, however, when the employer has violated the employee's con-
stitutional rights and the employee seeks specific performance of the em-
ployment contract. 28 4 Similarly, in the case of a retaliatory discharge,
the employer has violated the employee's statutory rights, and the em-
275. Malik v. Apex Int'l Alloys, Inc., 762 F.2d 77, 80-81 (10th Cir. 1985); see also Harless
v. First Natl Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692, 701-02 (W. Va. 1982).
276. For a discussion of intentional infliction of emotional distress, see PROSSER AND
KEETON, supra note 169, § 12.
277. See generally Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employees,
26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 449 (1985).
278. E.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 741Hl. 2d 172, 178, 384 N.E.2d 353, 355 (1978) (court
awarded $749 in compensatory damages).
279. Id. at 181-88, 384 N.E.2d at 357-60.
280. See, eg., id. at 186-88, 384 N.E.2d at 359-60; Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668,
670, 428 A.2d 1317, 1318 (1981); Webb v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 697 P.2d 519, 522-23
(Okla. 1985); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tenn. 1984). See generally
Annot., 44 A.L.R.4TH 1131, §§ 13, 15 (1986). For a discussion of the right to recover punitive
damages under statutory retaliatory discharge tort actions, see supra notes 104-11 & accompa-
nying text.
281. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 187-90, 384 N.E.2d 353, 360-61 (1978).
282. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-290a (West Supp. 1985).
283. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 228, § 12.25, at 929-3 1.
284. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493-95 (1985); Endress
v. Brookdale Community College, 144 N.J. Super. 109, 129-30, 364 A.2d 1080, 1090-91
(1976). See generally Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and
the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 111, 128 (1981) (approving Endress).
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ployee should be entitled to equitable relief against the employer. 28 5
The plaintiff should be entitled to preliminary injunctive relief
whenever it is appropriate. 286 A wrongfully discharged employee may be
harmed irreparably by waiting a year or more for reinstatement follow-
ing a trial on the merits of the retaliatory discharge action.2 87 Although
no court has yet issued a preliminary injunction to reinstate a workers'
compensation claimant, such relief has been accorded to plaintiffs alleg-
ing retaliatory discharge under Title VII.288 These cases should provide
a useful precedent to workers' compensation claimants seeking immedi-
ate reinstatement.
In addition to recognizing a civil cause of action for legal and equi-
table relief, the Connecticut statute creates an alternative administrative
remedy.289 The relief authorized comprises both reinstatement and back
pay.290 The claimant who seeks administrative relief is not allowed to
recover compensatory or punitive damages. The trade-off, however, is
that the administrative remedy may be more expeditious and less costly.
An administrative remedy should be provided by statute, particu-
larly in those jurisdictions where it takes several years to bring a civil
case to trial. Instead of making the administrative remedy an alternative
to a tort action, however, legislatures should consider making it a cumu-
lative remedy.29' Such an approach would permit an employee to re-
cover back pay and reinstatement through the administrative proceeding
285. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.90 (Page
1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 6 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.121, .410,
.415, .420 (1983); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 830 7c (Vernon Supp. 1986); VA. CODE § 65.1-40.1
(Supp. 1985).
By way of analogy, a finding of intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII "pre-
sumptively entitles the plaintiff to reinstatement." Henry v. Lennox Indus., Inc., 768 F.2d
746, 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
286. See generally R. LEAVELL, J. LOVE & G. NELSON, EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTI-
TUTION AND DAMAGES, ch. 2, § I(C) (4th ed. 1986).
287. See generally Ashtor, The Availability of Preliminary Injunctive Relief to Private
Plaintiffs Pending Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Action Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 51 (1976); Jauvtis, Sidestepping the EEOC
Granting Preliminary Injunctive Relief to Private Plaintiffs, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 485 (1983-
1984); Richards, Preliminary Relief in Employment Discrimination Cases, 66 Ky. L. REV. 39
(1977).
288. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982); see, e.g., Sheehan v. Purolator Courier Corp., 676 F.2d
877, 879 (2d Cir. 1981); Drew v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 69, 72 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 935 (1974).
289. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-290a(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
290. Id.
291. For a discussion of the advantages of a cumulative remedy approach, see Love, Ac-
tions, supra note 252, at 876-79, 896-97.
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without barring the employee's tort claim for punitive damages and com-
pensatory damages for noneconomic losses.
The cumulative remedy approach particularly suits retaliatory dis-
charge claims. The defendants are employers who have violated the
spirit of the workers' compensation laws by discharging employees who
have claimed benefits for work-related injuries. The plaintiffs are em-
ployees who have been deprived not only of compensation for their inju-
ries, but also of their jobs. Professor Larson correctly characterizes the
conduct of the defendants in retaliatory discharge actions as "contempti-
ble."'292 The cumulative remedy approach allows the plaintiffs to seek
swift reinstatement and back pay through the administrative process. At
the same time, it permits the plaintiffs to file contemporaneous tort
claims for damages that will serve to deter and to punish the defendants'
contemptible conduct. There is no danger of double recovery, however,
because back pay would be recoverable exclusively in the administrative
proceeding, while other types of compensatory damages and punitive
damages would be recoverable exclusively in the tort action. The admin-
istrative remedy would be easy to implement because every jurisdiction
already has established some type of administrative tribunal to adjudicate
workers' compensation claims. That same tribunal could be designated
to process the retaliatory discharge claims of workers' compensation
claimants.
A "cumulative remedy" favors the employee. The "alternative rem-
edy" prescribed by the Connecticut statute, by contrast, favors the em-
ployer because it eliminates the threat of punitive damages if the
employee elects the administrative remedy. Since the employer in a re-
taliatory discharge case is being charged with intentional wrongdoing,
the "cumulative remedy," favoring the employee, provides more com-
plete relief for the full range of wrongs encompassed by the retaliatory
discharge action.
Conclusion
Since 1973, the tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers'
compensation claim has evolved through an interactive process between
the courts and the state legislatures. This Article has traced the contours
of the prima facie case, identified the affirmative defenses, and recom-
mended a spectrum of legal and equitable remedies for the wrongfully
discharged workers' compensation claimant.
Although the Article focuses on retaliatory discharge actions in the
292. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.36(a), at 13-93 (1983).
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context of workers' compensation claimants, it should provide useful in-
sights with respect to all types of retaliatory discharge actions. Once a
court has determined that an employer has discriminated against an em-
ployee in retaliation for some type of protected conduct, the remaining
issues of the prima facie case are the same, regardless of the reason for
the discrimination. First, what conduct by an employer qualifies as an
actionable discharge? And second, was the worker discharged for exer-
cising a legal right, or for some other reason? Similarly, the defenses are
the same for any type of retaliatory discharge action. The court will have
to determine which statute of limitations is applicable and whether the
action is preempted by federal labor laws or precluded by the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. Finally, the same remedial principles
apply to all retaliatory discharge actions. Plaintiffs will usually request
legal relief in the form of compensatory and punitive damages. The mea-
sure of recovery recommended in this Article can apply to any retalia-
tory discharge action. Plaintiffs may also seek reinstatement. This
Article has recommended that such relief be made available through
either equitable or administrative proceedings. Although courts do not
ordinarily order specific performance of personal service contracts, the
victims of retaliatory discharge should be entitled to equitable relief in
order to protect their statutory and constitutional rights.
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